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THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND THE
1983-1984 TERM
TIMOTHY E. GAMMON*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Soviet and American people are guaranteed security
in their homes and protected from illegal searches by re-
markably similar constitutional provisions.' Different con-
sequences have resulted not from the slight differences in
wording, but rather from the power vested in the American
judiciary to breathe life into the words of the fourth amend-
ment. The judiciary, however, has the reciprocal power to
squeeze the life out of the amendment, and in four cases de-
cided during the 1983-1984 Term, the United States
Supreme Court took strides toward doing so.
History, not logic, is the key to understanding the fourth
amendment, the exclusionary rule, and the dilemma of ac-
commodating an individual's fourth amendment rights with
society's interest in convicting the guilty. It is difficult to tear
* A.B., Drury College, Springfield, Missouri, 1968; M.Ed., Drury College, 1970;
J.D., St. Louis University, 1974; LL.M., Harvard University, 1976; Senior Staff Attor-
ney, United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
1. U.S.S.R. CONST. arts. 55-57 provides:
Citizens are guaranteed inviolability of the home. No one may, without lawful
grounds, enter a home against the will of the residents. The privacy of the
citizens, their correspondene ... [and] communications is protected by law.
Citizens have the right to protection by the courts against encroachments of
their... personal freedom and property.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
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the strand that carries the fourth amendment and the exclu-
sionary rule from the seamless web of Anglo-American
political and legal history. Accordingly, this Article first
presents a brief historical overview of the exclusionary rule,
focusing on certain touchstone cases central to its genesis
and subsequent development. Second, the four major exclu-
sionary rule cases of the United States Supreme Court's
1983-1984 Term are addressed. And finally, this back-
ground is followed by an analysis of the various policy argu-
ments which have surrounded the exclusionary rule, an
affirmation of faith in the rule, and a series of proposals to
give it vitality in the future.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. English Law
The sanctity of the home provided the foundation for the
fourth amendment.2 "[O]ne of the most essential branches
of English liberty is the freedom of one's house. A man's
house is his castle; and whilst he is quiet, he is as well
guarded as a prince . . .-
In England this sanctity was challenged by the Star
Chamber proceedings, which resulted in the issuance of gen-
2. For a discussion of the history of the fourth amendment, see generally A. AM-
STERDAM, FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS ON SEARCH, SEIZURE, ARREST,
DETENTION AND INTERROGATION BY STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS (1966);
E. CHANNiNG, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1912); R. DAVIS, FEDERAL
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES (1964); T. GARDNER & V. MANIAN, PRINCIPALS AND
CASES OF THE LAW OF ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE (1974); L. KOLBREK & G.
PORTER, THE LAW OF ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE (1965); W. LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (1978); J. LANDYNSKI,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT (1966); N. LASSON, THE HISTORY
AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTI-
TUTION (1937); G. TREVELYAN, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1905); J. VARON,
SEARCHES, SEIZURES, AND IMMUNITIES (2d ed. 1974); J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed.
1940); Atkinson, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained through Unreasonable Searches
and Seizures, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 11 (1925); Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and
Seizures, 34 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1921); Kaplan, Search and Seizures.- A No-Man's
Land in the Criminal Law, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 474 (1961); Posner, Rethinking the
Fourth Amendment, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 49; Stengel, The Background of the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 4 U. RICH. L. REV. 60 (1969);
Woody & Rosen, Fourth Amendment, Viewed and Reviewed, 11 S. TEX. L.J. 315
(1969).
3. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 379 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting
W. TUDOR, LIFE OF JAMES OTIS OF MASSACHUSETTS 68 (1823)).
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eral warrants or authorizations permitting government
"messengers" to arrest anyone and search any place to un-
cover authors, printers, and publications.4 These roving
commissions were necessary, the Crown reasoned, to protect
itself from seditious libel.
These general authorizations were attacked by the Eng-
lish libertarian, Wilkes, and addressed by Lords Camden,
Lofft, Mansfield, and Prat between 1763 and 1765.6 For ex-
ample, in Entick v. Carrington,7 Lord Camden acknowledged
a relationship between unreasonable searches and self-in-
crimination by holding that general warrants violated the
principle against self-incrimination.8 He condemned the un-
certainty of general warrants and provided the philosophical
cornerstone for a right built not only upon form, in requiring
particular procedures in obtaining a warrant, but also upon
substance, in condemning unreasonable searches regardless
of the procedures followed.9
B. The Fourth Amendment
America was contemporaneously plagued with writs of
assistance, which were general search commissions used to
discover smugglers and confiscate their stolen property. Ex-
cessive use of these writs provoked attacks on the Crown led
by John Adams and James Otis, Jr.10 Provisions similar to
the fourth amendment were included in state constitutions
4. Fraenkel, supra note 2, at 362-63. Professor Lasson traces this sanctity to bibli-
cal times. See N. LASSON, supra note 2, at 13-50.
5. Fraenkel, supra note 2, at 363.
6. See, e.g., Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765); Money v. Leach, 96
Eng. Rep. 320 (1765); Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (1763); Wilkes v. Wood, 98
Eng. Rep. 489 (1763).
7. 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765).
8. Id
It is very certain, that the law obligeth no man to accuse himself, because the
necessary means of compelling self-accusation, falling upon the innocent as
well as the guilty, would be both cruel and unjust; and it should seem, that
search for evidence is disallowed upon the same principle.
Id.
9. For a discussion of Lord Camden's opinion in Enick see Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 626-30 (1886).
10. See N. LAsSON, supra note 2, at 51-78; Atkinson, supra note 2, at 14; Fraenkel,
supra note 2, at 364-65.
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and laws," and the fourth amendment, taken from the 1765
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, was incorporated into
the Bill of Rights. 2
The first significant United States Supreme Court fourth
amendment pronouncement came in 1886 from Justice
Bradley in Boyd v. United States. 3 Like Lord Camden, Jus-
tice Bradley linked the freedom from unreasonable searches
to the privilege against self-incrimination. 4 The Court held
that any procedure, regardless of form, which accomplished
the result intended by an unauthorized search violated the
fourth amendment.' 5 The amendment itself, and not some
judicially fashioned exclusionary rule, was the basis for for-
bidding the compulsory production of papers. 6 Thus, even
though a statute expressly authorized the government to re-
ceive evidence produced from a search warrant pursuant to a
compulsory order, the fourth amendment could serve to bar
its use. ' 7
Unlike Entick, the Boyd decision was short lived 8 and
the Supreme Court demonstrated how much less con-
straining stare decisis was in America than England in an-
swering the question that inevitably surfaced following the
Boyd decision: does the mere receipt at trial of evidence
seized in an unlawful search constitute reversible error? Al-
though several lower federal and state courts relying on the
Boyd decision had reached a contrary result,' 9 in Adams v.
11. See F. STIMSON, FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES (1908); Atkinson, supra note 2, at 12; Fraenkel, supra note 2, at 361.
12. Fraenkel, supra note 2, at 362.
13. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
14. See id at 633-35.
15. Id. at 622.
16. See id.
17. Id. at 620-24.
18. The Boyd decision was criticized as unnecessarily broad by the concurrence,
see 116 U.S. at 639 (Miller, J., concurring), and later in the legal literature. Seegener-
ally N. LASSON, supra note 2, at 107-10; Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction on
the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1930); Nelson, Search & Seizure."
Boyd v. United States, 9 A.B.A. J. 773 (1923); Wigmore, Using Evidence Obtained by
Illegal Search and Seizure, 8 A.B.A. J. 479 (1922).
19. United States v. Flagg, 233 F. 481 (2d Cir. 1916); United States v. Wong
Quong Wong, 94 F. 832 (D. Vt. 1899); State v. Sheridan, 121 Iowa 164, 96 N.W. 730
(1903); Blum v. State, 94 Md. 375, 51 A. 26 (1902); Town of Blacksburg v. Beam, 104
S.C. 146, 88 S.E. 441 (1916); State v. Slamon, 73 Vt. 212, 50 A. 1097 (1901).
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New York 20 the Supreme Court upheld a state criminal con-
viction against the exact kind of fourth and fifth amendment
challenge the Court had invited in Boyd. Adams argued that
the state court's receipt into evidence of papers containing
his handwriting, which were seized from his office pursuant
to a warrant that authorized a search for gambling materials,
violated the fourth and fifth amendments.2 ' He maintained
that those amendments were applicable to his state action
through the privileges and immunities clause of the four-
teenth amendment.22 The Court refused to address this ar-
gument. 3 Although the Court stated it did not want to
detract from the authority of Boyd,24 it did exactly that by
taking a giant step backwards from the principals articulated
in that case. Justice Day opined that if evidence were perti-
nent to an issue in a case, it was not important whether the
evidence was legally or illegally seized. 5
The contradiction between the Adams and Boyd deci-
sions was presented in the 1914 Weeks v. United States26 de-
cision. A warrantless search of Weeks' house by police and
federal agents produced incriminating evidence, all of which
was subsequently admitted at Weeks' federal criminal trial
after his pretrial motion to return the illegally seized evi-
20. 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
21. Id. at 594.
22. Id at 590-91.
23. Id. at. 594.
24. See id at 597. This turnabout from the Boyd decision actually reaffirmed the
general common-law rule that probative evidence should be admitted regardless of
the source.
25. See id at 594-96. See also United States v. Mills, 185 F. 318 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1911), appeal dismissed sub. nonL Wise v. Mills, 220 U.S. 549 (1911). Pursuant to the
authority of the Supreme Court's Boyddecision, the defendant in Mills filed a pretrial
motion seeking the return of seized books and papers. Upon the court's granting of
defendant's motion, the prosecutor refused to return the books and papers, and the
court convicted him of contempt. The Supreme Court dismissed the prosecutor's ap-
peal on the grounds that no constitutional question was presented. The Supreme
Court observed that the lower court had the power to return the seized papers because
of its authority to correct abuses of discretion by court officers. See 220 U.S. at 555.
26. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). See generally Atkinson, Prohibiton and the Doctrine of
the Weeks Case, 23 MIcH. L. REv. 748 (1925); Edwards, Standing to Suppress Unrea-
sonably Seized Evidence, 47 Nw. U.L. Rav. 471 (1952); Grant, Constitutional Basis of
the Rule Forbidding the Use of Illegally Seized Evidence, 15 S. CAL. L. REv. 60, 62-63
(1941); Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 181,
182-85, 198-99 (1969); Waite, Police Regulation by Rule of Evidence, 42 MICH. L. REv.
679, 681 (1944).
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dence was denied. The Supreme Court, again speaking
through Justice Day, spumed Adams for Boyd and refused to
sanction the use of such evidence.2 8 The Court held that to
admit such evidence would render the fourth amendment
valueless and that if such were the case it might as well be
stricken from the Constitution. 9
C. The Exclusionary Rule after Weeks
The Weeks decision precipitated fifty years of scholarly
and judicial debate on whether the exclusionary rule should
be applied to state proceedings. In Wolf v. Colorado 3 0 and
Irvine v. California,3' two of a parade of cases refusing to
27. 232 U.S. at 386-89.
28. See id. at 386-96. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the evidence
seized by local police acting alone could be admitted into evidence, but that the evi-
dence seized by the federal agents could not be admitted into evidence. The Court
held that other avenues of redress against the local police (all those who violated an
individual's rights other than the federal government and its agencies) were open, but
did not detail what those avenues were. See id. at 398.
29. See id. at 393-94. The language could be interpreted as meaning that the
Supreme Court was basing its holding on the fourth amendment itself. If the Court
meant that the fourth amendment demanded exclusion of such evidence so that it
would not become a nullity, the fourth amendment would seem to be the basis for the
holding.
An alternative interpretation is that the Court created a judicial remedy not based
on the fourth amendment but rather on the Court's power to control lower court
proceedings. Scholars have adopted this interpretation and, consequently, trace the
exclusionary rule to the Weeks decision and not to the Boyd decision. Perhaps this
interpretation is what the Court intended, but any difference in basis for the rulings in
Boyd and Weeks may have been an attempt by the Court to distinguish and circum-
vent the intervening case of Adams. See Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusion-
ary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis" Rather than an "Empirical Proposition "4 16
CREIGHTON L. REV. 565, 581-85 (1983) (stating exclusionary rule is "judge-made");
Mathias, The Exclusionary Rule Revisited, 28 Loy. L. REv. 1, 2 (1982) (stating exclu-
sionary rule born in Weeks case).
In any event, prohibiting the use of illegally seized evidence in Weeks through a
judicially created rule left open the question of whether Congress might supercede a
judicially imposed rule over lower court operations by authorizing particular evi-
dence-gathering acts. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 39-40 (1949) (Black, J.,
concurring).
30. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
31. 347 U.S. 128 (1954). For a discussion of the Wolfand Irvine decisions, see
generally Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liber-
ties, 45 U. ILL. L.F. 1 (1950); Fraenkel, Search and Seizure Developments in the Law
Since 1948, 41 IowA L. REv. 67, 77-84 (1955); Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years
Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and Federal Courts, 43 MINN. L. REV. 1083
(1959); Knowlton, The Supreme Court, Mapp v. Ohio and Due Process ofLaw, 49
IOWA L. Rnv. 14, 20-24, 31 (1963); Reynard, Freedom From Unreasonable Search and
[Vol. 68:1
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extend the exclusionary rule to state proceedings, the United
States Supreme Court identified other remedies for unlawful
police conduct. For example, the Court noted that if law
enforcement officials willfully deprived a United States citi-
zen of a right or privilege secured by the fourteenth amend-
ment, such as the fourth amendment right to be secure in
one's home, the unlawful conduct would give rise to a fed-
eral cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 242.32
A half-step forward was taken in the 1960 Elkins v.
United States33 decision when the Court abolished the doc-
trine that illegally obtained evidence was inadmissible in a
federal prosecution if seized by federal officers, but admissi-
ble if seized by state officers.34 And thanks to strong dissents
by Justices Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge in the Wolf de-
cision, the exclusionary rule was finally given full vitality in
Mapp v. Ohio.35 Justice Clark wrote for the majority:
Seizure - A Second Class Constitutional RightZ 25 IND. L.J. 259, 308-13 (1950);
Rudd, Present Signifcance of Constitutional Guarantees against Unreasonable Searches
and Seizures, 18 U. Cn. L. REv. 387, 387-388, 415-16 (1949); Comment, Wolfv. Colo-
rado and Unreasonable Search and Seizure in Calffornim 38 CALIF. L. REv. 498 (1950).
32. Irvine, 347 U.S. at 137. The Irvine Court indicated: "This section provides
that whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom, will-
fully subjects any inhabitant of any state to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or
immunities secured or protected by the Constitution of the United States shall be
fined or imprisoned." Id.
Statutory and common law actions were catalogued in Wolf, 338 U.S. at 30 n.l,
and a report of federal actions was presented in Irvine, 347 U.S. at 155-56 app.
33. 364 U.S. 206 (1960). See generally Berman & Oberst, Admissibilify of Evi-
dence Obtained by an Unconstitutional Search and Seizure - A Federal Problem, 55
Nw. U.L. REv. 525, 538-52 (1960); Eichner, "Silver Platter" - No Longer Usedfor
Serving Evidence in Federal Courts, 13 U. FLA. L. REv. 311 (1960); Grant, The Tar-
nished Silver Platter: Federalism and Admissibility of Illegally Seized Evidence, 8
UCLA L. REv. 1, 15-24, 42-43 (1961).
34. 364 U.S. at 223.
35. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See generally Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amend-
ment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 1; Broeder, The Decline and Fall of
Wolf v. Colorado, 41 NEB. L. REv. 185 (1961); Bums, Mapp v. Ohio: An All-Ameri-
can Mistake, 19 DE PAUL L. REv. 80 (1969); Kamisar, Public Safety vs. Individual
Liberties: Some "Facts" and "Theories" 53 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI.
171, 173-76, 181-82 (1962); LaFave & Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's
Role in Making and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MICH. L. Rev. 987,
1002-03 (1965); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U.
CHI. L. REv. 665, 667-72, 675-715 (1970); Rogers, The Fourth Amendment and Evi-
dence Obtained by a Government Agent's Trespass, 42 NEB. L. Rev. 166, 166 (1962);
Thompson, Unconstitutional Search and Seizure and the Myth -of Harmless Error, 42
NOTRE DAME LAW. 457, 460-64 (1967); Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty
1984]
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[We once again examine Wolfs constitutional documen-
tation of the right to privacy free from unreasonable state
intrusion, and. . . are led by it to close the only courtroom
door remaining open to evidence secured by official law-
lessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all
persons as a specific guarantee against that . . . conduct.
We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same
authority, inadmissible in a state court.3 6
The Weeks Court had left open other avenues of redress, the
Wolf Court had mapped those avenues, and the Mapp Court
observed their dead ends. Justice Clark described the recon-
ciliation of state and federal law in Mapp as an end to the
war between the Constitution and common sense.37  He
lauded the Mapp holding for its settling effect in giving the
individual constitutional guarantees, the police no less than
that to which honest law enforcement was entitled, and the
courts that judicial integrity so necessary to the true adminis-
tration of justice.38
Notwithstanding the calming assurances of Justice Clark,
debate over the exclusionary rule continued and continues
yet today. Criticism of the exclusionary rule was long led by
Justice Black.39 Winds of change were forecast by Justice
White's endorsement of a good faith exception to the rule in
Stone v. Powel.4 ° Justice White reiterated his view in Illinois
v. Gates41 and catalogued Supreme Court limitations of the
exclusionary rule.42
In a series of decisions the Court limited standing to raise
exclusionary rule objections to criminal defendants on
States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319; Wilson, Perspectives of Mapp v. Ohio, 11 U. KAN. L. REV.
423 (1963).
36. 367 U.S. at 654-55.
37. See id. at 657.
38. See id. at 660.
39. See, eg., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 493-510 (1971) (Black,
J., concurring and dissenting); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 39-40 (1949) (Black, J.,
concurring). See generally G. DUNNE, HUGo BLACK AND THE JUDICIAL REVOLU-
TION (1977); J. FRANK, MR. JUSTICE BLACK: THE MAN AND His OPINIONS (1973).
40. 428 U.S. 465, 537-39 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
41. 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2336-51 (1983) (White, J., concurring).
42. Id at 2340-44.
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trial.43 The Supreme Court refused to extend the rule to
grand jury proceedings. 44 The Court permitted the use of
evidence illegally seized by state officials in a federal civil
suit on the grounds that the social costs of exclusion out-
weighed the probability of deterring unlawful police con-
duct.45 The Court also approved the use of illegally seized
evidence offered to impeach defendants testifying on their
own behalf 46 and allowed testimony of a witness at trial re-
garding evidence derived from a concededly unconstitu-
tional search.47 The Court has also refused to exclude
evidence when law enforcement agents have acted in good
faith reliance upon laws subsequently ruled unconstitu-
tional.48 These rulings may arguably be justified as only
clarifications of, and not restrictions on, the operation of the
exclusionary rule; nevertheless they substantially narrow the
broad pronouncement of the Weeks and Mapp decisions that
evidence obtained illegally must be suppressed.
III. THE SUPREME COURT 1983-1984 TERM
A Supreme Court majority side-stepped the exclusionary
rule on procedural grounds during the 1982-1983 Term in
Illinois v. Gates.49 However, the 1983-1984 Term was a dif-
ferent story as the Court decided several cases that further
limit the scope and breadth of the exclusionary rule. Al-
though these decisions were a departure from the broadest
readings of the fourth amendment announced under Chief
Justice Warren, they were hardly unforeseen. The Burger
Court's preoccupation with avoiding and disregarding pro-
cedural and technical traps to focus on the ultimate question
of guilt had long suggested that, unless the Court majority
43. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980); United States v. Salvucci, 448
U.S. 83 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); Brown v. United States, 411
U.S. 223 (1973); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
44. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
45. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
46. See United States v. Haven, 446 U.S. 620 (1980); Walder v. United States, 347
U.S. 62 (1954).
47. See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
48. See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979); United States v. Peltier, 422
U.S. 531 (1975).
49. See 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2321-25 (1983).
1984]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
viewed the abandonment or modification of the exclusionary
rule as impailing the integrity of the criminal trial process,
the rule would be modified and perhaps abandoned.
The Burger Court has shown the greatest interest in those
rights that protect the innocent and thereby the trial process,
such as the right to counsel and the prohibition against co-
erced confessions.5 ° It has shown less interest in those rights
that may serve to protect the guilty, such as the exclusionary
rule.5 A kind of "hierarchy of rights" has developed, based
on the likelihood that denial of a particular right might re-
sult in the conviction of the innocent. Thus, where the guilt
of an individual is obvious and a conviction appears reliable,
but is challenged on the "technical grounds" of police mis-
conduct or judicial error, the Court is inclined to limit rather
than preserve or expand the individual's rights. The follow-
ing decisions illustrate how the Court's preoccupation with
seeing the guilty convicted resulted in a modification, if not
an abandonment, of the exclusionary rule during the 1983-
1984 Term.
A. United States v. Jacobsen
Although it did not specifically address the exclusionary
rule, the United States v. Jacobsen52 decision was significant
because it served as a vivid illustration of the Court's preoc-
cupation with conviction of the obviously guilty and fore-
shadowed what was to come later in the Term when the
Court addressed the exclusionary rule. In Jacobsen employ-
ees of Federal Express, a private freight carrier, discovered a
white powdery substance in the innermost of a series of
plastic bags that were concealed inside a tube in a damaged
package. 53 The package,. which consisted of a cardboard box
wrapped in brown paper, was examined pursuant to com-
pany policy by a Federal Express manager. 54 Federal Ex-
50. See, e.g., Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S.
454 (1981); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
51. See, for example, supra text accompanying notes 43-48 (note that Alderman,
Wong Sun, and Walder predate the Burger Court) and infra notes 66-117 and accom-
panying text.
52. 104 S. Ct. 1652 (1984).
53. Id. at 1655.
54. Id.
[Vol. 68:1
EXCL USIONR Y RULE
press employees called the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) to report their findings, and DEA
agents were dispatched.5 5 The contents had been replaced
when the agents arrived, but the tube containing the bags
holding the powder was still visible. 6 The agent opened the
bags and performed a field test to determine whether the
substance was cocaine.57 When the field test proved positive
the agents rewrapped the packages, obtained a warrant to
search the address on the package, executed the warrant, and
arrested the Jacobsens 8 The Jacobsens were convicted of
drug possession, but the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed the conviction on the grounds that the evidence
should have been suppressed because the warrant was the
product of a warrantless, illegal search and seizure by the
DEA agents. 9
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's deci-
sion and reaffirmed the conviction.6 0 The Court first rea-
soned that the action of the Federal Express employees was
an act within the private sector which did not violate the
fourth amendment.6' The Court then proceeded to analyze
whether the subsequent actions of the DEA agents in remov-
ing the bags and testing the contents exceeded the scope of
the private search by infringing upon a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy that had not already been invaded by the
private search. The Court majority concluded that after the
private search the contents of the package were in plain view
for the federal agents and that it was reasonable for the
agents to seize and test the contents because it was apparent
that the bags contained contraband and little else.62 In short,
the Court concluded that because the Jacobsens had no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the bags at the time the
agents arrived and found them in plain view, the seizure and
55. Id
56. Id
57. Id
58. Id.
59. See 683 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 1652 (1984).
60. 104 S. Ct. at 1652.
61. Id. at 1656 (citing Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980)). See also
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1975).
62. 104 S. Ct. at 1659-60 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487-
90 (1971); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475-76 (1921)).
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test were based on probable cause, and the failure to obtain
a warrant was reasonable.63 Balancing the interests of the
police with those of the individual, the Court concluded that
the safeguards of a warrant would only minimally advance
fourth amendment interests.6"
Although the Court focused on the plain view doctrine in
the Jacobsen decision and did not specifically address the ex-
clusionary rule, the case illustrates the operation of the "hi-
erarchy of rights" which would later account for the Court's
attack on the rule. Because the incriminating acts of the de-
fendant were not questioned, the majority was unwilling to
uphold the Eighth Circuit's decision and reverse the convic-
tion on what probably would be asserted to be mere "techni-
cal grounds." The Court thus carved out yet another
exception to the warrant requirement 65 - warrantless
searches preceded by a search by private persons - and was
able to save the conviction.
B. Nix v. Williams
In Nix v. Williams66 the police informed counsel for de-
fendant Williams, a murder suspect, that they would pick up
Williams and transport him from Davenport to Des Moines,
Iowa without questioning.67 Without advising him of his
rights, the police prevailed upon Williams to show them
where his ten year old victim was buried by stating that the
parents "should be entitled to a Christian burial for the little
girl who was snatched away from them on Christmas [Elve
and murdered" and that an impending snow storm might
make it impossible to find her.68  The defendant subse-
63. 104 S. Ct. at 1661 (citing United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983); Texas
v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1540-44 (1983); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587
(1980); General Motors Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 354 (1977);
Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968)).
64. See 104 S. Ct. at 1663. See also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973);
United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 252-53 (1970).
65. For a discussion of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, see generally
Project, Twelth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court
and Courts of Appeals 1981-82, 71 GEO. L.J. 339, 369-96 (1982-83).
66. 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984).
67. Id. at 2505.
68. Id. at 2504-05.
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quently led police to the victim's body.69
In 1977 the Supreme Court affirmed a divided Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals panel, holding that the comments
of the detective constituted an interrogation of the defendant
in violation of his right to counsel.7 0 The Supreme Court
noted, however, that although Williams' incriminating state-
ment could not be introduced into evidence upon retrial, evi-
dence of the location and condition of the victim's body
might be admissible under a theory that the body would
have been discovered anyway, even without Williams'
statements.
71
Following conviction upon retrial, the Iowa Supreme
Court affirmed, finding a "hypothetical independent source"
exception to the exclusionary rule.72 The two elements of
the exception, as recognized by the Iowa Supreme Court,
were proof that (1) the police did not act in bad faith to
hasten discovery of the evidence, and (2) the evidence would
have been discovered by lawful means.73
In subsequent habeas corpus proceedings, the Eighth
Circuit assumed, without deciding, that an inevitable discov-
ery exception to the exclusionary rule did in fact exist as de-
scribed by the Iowa Supreme Court.74 But finding that the
State had not proved the lack of bad faith element of the
exception, the Eighth Circuit reversed the federal district
court's denial of the writ.75
Decrying this holding for putting the police in a worse
position than they would have been had there been no im-
proper interrogation, the United States Supreme Court re-
versed the Eighth Circuit, thereby denying the writ and
upholding the conviction.76 The Court emphasized that the
only element of the exception the State need prove is that the
evidence would have been discovered anyway because
69. Id at 2505.
70. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
71. See id at 406-07 n.12.
72. See State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248, 260 (Iowa 1979).
73. Id. at 258.
74. See Williams v. Nix, 700 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1983), rep'd, 104 S. Ct. 2501
(1984).
75. See id at 1173.
76. See Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 2510 (1984), rev'g, 700 F.2d 1164 (8th
Cir. 1983).
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"[e]xclusion of physical evidence that would inevitably have
been discovered adds nothing to either the integrity or fair-
ness of a criminal trial. '77
The dissent of Justice Brennan, in which Justice Mar-
shall joined, recognized the inevitable discovery exception as
akin to the independent source exception recognized since
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,7 8 but noted that in
the inevitable discovery exception, unlike the independent
source exception, the evidence is not actually obtained.79
This distinction, the dissent reasoned, should demand a
higher standard of proof before such evidence may be
admitted. 0
The overwhelming evidence suggested Williams was
guilty. Despite recognizing constitutional violations of the
defendant's rights, the Supreme Court focused on the ulti-
mate question of guilt in concluding, by implication, that the
constitutional violations by the police did not affect the trial
process or increase the likelihood of convicting an innocent
defendant.
C Massachusetts v. Sheppard and United States v. Leon
The Jacobsen and Williams decisions were mere pre-
liminaries to the main bout fought in two unrelated cases
argued and decided the same day. While the two cases ap-
peared to hold the fate of the exclusionary rule, it became
clear that if the Supreme Court again focused on guilt, these
two convictions would be vindicated.
In Massachusetts v. Sheppard81 the state trial court re-
fused to suppress evidence, despite finding a search warrant
defective for failing to specifically list the items to be
seized.8" An affidavit listing those items existed, but because
of an oversight by the police, it was not attached to the war-
rant or incorporated by reference. 83 The state trial court re-
77. 104 S. Ct. at 2510.
78. 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
79. Nix, 104 S. Ct. at 2517 (Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting).
80. Id
81. 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984).
82. Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488, _ 441 N.E.2d 725, 731-36
(1982).
83. Id. at _ 441 N.E.2d at 731-32.
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fused to apply the exclusionary rule, finding "the actual
search undertaken was within the limits of the authority the
police thought reasonably had been granted." 84 The court
concluded that police conduct would not be altered by ex-
cluding otherwise relevant and reliable evidence.8 5 There-
fore, the only consequences of applying the exclusionary
rule would be to impair the truth-finding function of the jury
by keeping probative evidence from them.8 6 The court thus
distinguished between errors committed by a judicial officer
in issuing the warrant and fourth amendment violations by
law enforcement officers in executing the warrant.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts acknowl-
edged the trial court's distinction between judicial and police
blunders and agreed that the exclusionary rule was not tai-
lored to deterring judicial misconduct. 88 The court ques-
tioned suppression of evidence as a deterrant where police
conduct was proper and the defendant was not prejudiced by
the judicial officer's error. 89 Nevertheless, the court reversed
the trial court on the grounds that the United States
Supreme Court had yet to approve an exception to the exclu-
sionary rule under such circumstances.90
In United States v. Leon 91 the federal district court sup-
pressed evidence obtained from a search conducted under a
warrant issued by a state judge.92 The district court found
that the police affidavit used to obtain the warrant relied, in
material part, on a confidential police informant whose reli-
ability and credibility had not been established.93 The court
found that other details in the warrant concerned another
transaction or were as consistent with innocence as with
guilt.94 The district court concluded that the warrant was
not based on probable cause, because the informant's credi-
84. Id at , 441 N.E.2d at 730.
85. Id. at - 441 N.E.2d at 730.
86. Id. at 441 N.E.2d at 730.
87. Id. at , 441 N.E.2d at 730.
88. See id at , 441 N.E.2d at 735.
89. See id. at , 441 N.E.2d at 733.
90. See id at , 441 N.E.2d at 735-36.
91. 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
92. Id. at 3411.
93. Id. n.2.
94. Id.
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bility and reliability were not sufficiently established, and
suppressed the seized evidence. A Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals panel, over one dissent, affirmed the suppression or-
der and specifically refused to recognize a good faith excep-
tion to the exclusionary rule.96
Supreme Court briefs and arguments in Leon and Shep-
pard focused on their particular facts and upon the compet-
ing interests of convicting the guilty and protecting the rights
of the criminal defendant. The government's position was
that a good faith 97 exception to the exclusionary rule should
be adopted by the Court.98 However, in the Sheppard case
Justice O'Connor expressed concern over the distinction be-
tween judicial error and police misconduct.99 She inquired
whether the police had an obligation to execute the warrant
as written and return to the magistrate when the warrant
failed to specify the place to be searched or the items to be
seized. ' °
On the final day of the 1983-1984 Term, the Supreme
Court reversed the Leon suppression order and sent the case
back for reconsideration in an opinion that held that the ex-
clusionary rule could be modified without jeopardizing its
ability to perform its intended function.10' Specifically, the
Court stated:
[The fourth amendment] has never been interpreted to pro-
scribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all
proceedings or against all persons.... o Our cases have
consistently recognized that unbending application of the
exclusionary sanction to enforce ideals of government rec-
titude would impede unacceptably the truth-finding func-
tions of judge and jury. 0 3
Writing for the majority, Justice White stated that by sup-
pressing inherently trustworthy, tangible evidence, the exclu-
sionary rule imposed substantial societal costs that, at least
95. See id.
96. See 104 S. Ct. at 3411.
97. Solicitor General Lee used the term "reasonable mistake."
98. See 52 U.S.L.W. at 3542-43.
99. See id.
100. See 52 U.S.L.W. at 3541-42.
101. See Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3412.
102. Id at 3412 (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976)).
103. 104 S. Ct. at 3413 (citing United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 (1980)).
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in the context of a seemingly valid search warrant, out-
weighed the benefit achieved by deterring official miscon-
duct.1°4 Justice White suggested that the exclusionary rule
was designed to deter the police misconduct rather than to
serve as punishment for judicial blunders and that the threat
of excluding relevant evidence could not be expected to sig-
nificantly deter neutral judicial officers who have no stake in
the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions.1 0 5 Al-
though he questioned the existence of empirical evidence
showing any deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule,106 he
pointed out that even if deterrence were assumed, the rule
could not be expected to deter "objectively reasonable law
enforcement activity.' 1 7 Introduction of this "objectively
reasonable" criteria, Justice White explained, requires not
only that the officer have a good faith belief in the validity of
the warrant, but also that this belief be reasonable when
evaluated objectively.10 8 Thus, a subjective belief based on
ignorance of the Constitution would not insulate an invalid
warrant from attack.
Justice White noted that "the preference for warrants is
most appropriately effectuated by according 'great defer-
ence' to the magistrate's determination."'' 0 9 But he explained
that this deference was bounded, suggesting appellate review
is appropriate to (1) determine whether the finding of prob-
able cause was based on a known or recklessly false affidavit,
(2) assure the neutrality and detachment of the magistrate
who must not become a rubber stamp for police law enforce-
ment activities, and (3) establish a substantial basis for the
warrant by requiring that the probable cause determination
reflect a proper analysis of the totality of the circumstances
and a warrant that is proper in form." 0 The majority thus
recognized the balance between the fourth amendment
rights of individuals and the societal interest in convicting
104. See 104 S. Ct. at 3416-19.
105. See id. at 3418-19.
106. See id. "No empirical researcher, proponent or opponent of the rule, has yet
been able to establish with any assurance whether the rule has a deterrent effect
. " Id. at 3419 (citing United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 452 n.22 (1976)).
107. 104 S. Ct. at 3419.
108. Id. at 3421.
109. Id at 3417.
110. See id.
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guilty criminal defendants, in this instance striking the bal-
ance against the fourth amendment.
Justice Blackmun concurred, but stated that the assump-
tions underlying the decision were provisional and would
now be tested in the real world of state and federal law en-
forcement."' Justice Brennan in dissent criticized the nar-
cotic effect of such balancing and cost-benefit analysis which
''creates an illusion of technical precision and
eluctability." 112 In conclusion, Justice Brennan despaired,
"[I]t now appears the Court's victory over the Fourth
Amendment is complete."' 13 Justice Stevens also dissented,
characterizing the majority's decision in Leon as a step to-
ward converting "a Bill of Rights into an unenforced honor
code that the police may follow at their discretion."'"14
The Sheppard case was also reversed that same day."15
The Court simply refused to uphold the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court's reversal of a first degree murder
conviction on such a highly technical defect in the search
warrant. 116 The Sheppard decision thus carves out another
exception to the exclusionary rule: evidence seized pursuant
to a warrant based on probable cause, but technically inva-
lid, need not be suppressed. 17
111. See id. at 3424 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The Court left open the possibil-
ity that the exclusionary rule could be reinstated with full force if experience proved it
necessary, for example, if police were to ignore the fourth amendment or magistrates
were to rubber stamp police misconduct. Justice Blackmun wrote that "[l~f it should
emerge from experience that, contrary to our expectations, the good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule results in a material change in police compliance with the
Fourth Amendment, we shall have to reconsider what we have undertaken here." Id
112. 104 S. Ct. at 3430 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
113. Id. In apparent rebuttal Justice White said, "[it] is not intended to signal our
unwillingness strictly to enforce the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, and we
do not believe that it will have this effect." 104 S. Ct. at 3422. He noted that the
officer's good faith belief must also be objectively reasonable. He concluded that evi-
dence would be suppressed if the police misled the magistrate in obtaining a warrant;
if the magistrate abandoned the appropriate judicial role; or if the warrant was on its
face obviously defective. Id at 3421-22.
114. 104 S. Ct. at 3456 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115. See Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. at 3424. Justice Stevens concurred with the major-
ity on the separate ground that the search was supported by probable cause regardless
of the defective warrant. See id at 3448-50 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justices Mar-
shall and Brennan dissented. See id. at 3430-46 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
116. See 104 S. Ct. at 3429-30.
117. In a third exclusionary rule decision handed down on the final day of the
1983-1984 Term, the Supreme Court held that illegally obtained evidence need not be
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IV. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND THE' FUTURE
The historical genesis, development, and subsequent di-
lution of the exclusionary rule in Nix, Sheppard, and Leon
are best understood in light of the continuing debate over
the merits of the rule. What follows is a brief summary of
the various public policy justifications and criticisms of the
exclusionary rule and, in light of these considerations, some
proposed alternatives for the future.
A. Analysis of the Rule
Proponents of the exclusionary rule contend that the
overriding public policy considerations of fairness, judicial
integrity, and the fourth amendment prohibition against un-
reasonable searches and seizures are more important than
any individual criminal conviction. 118 They argue it is less
important that courts admit all reliable and relevant evi-
dence than it is that courts ensure proper evidence-gathering
methods are followed and constitutionally defective methods
avoided." 9 Specifically, proponents maintain that: (1) ex-
clusion preserves and protects the integrity of the courts; (2)
the fourth amendment was adopted to protect individuals
from police misconduct, and this result is best accomplished
by excluding illegally seized evidence; and (3) exclusion of
illegally seized evidence does not of itself free the guilty, but
merely returns the status quo, that is, the position the indi-
vidual would have been in but for the unlawful intrusion. 120
Thus, a conviction can still be obtained using legally seized
evidence. A warrant, like that in the Sheppard case, which
fails to specify the items to be seized may prevent several
functions of the warrant from being served. For example,
the individual and the police are deprived of notice as to
what is subject to search and seizure. 12 1
excluded from a civil deportation hearing. See United States Immigration & Natural-
ization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 3479 (1984).
118. See, e.g., Canon, Ideology and Reality in the Debate Over the Exclusionary
Rule: A Conservative Argumentfor its Retention; 23 S. TEX. L.J. 559, 578-82 (1982);
Kamisar, A Defense of the Exclusionary Rule, 15 CRAM. L. BULL. 5, 12-14 (1979);
Oaks, supra note 35, at 667-72.
119. See, for example, the authorities listed supra note 118.
120. See supranote 118.
121. See Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3422.
19841
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Critics of the exclusionary rule counter that the admis-
sion of evidence should be predicated solely upon its relia-
bility and relevance and that excluding reliable evidence
works against police efforts to eliminate crime by freeing the
guilty. 122 They note that there is little evidence to suggest
that the rule has had, or will have, a deterrent effect when
the police operate in good faith. 123
In answer to those advocating this type of modification,
the exclusionary rule's defenders respond that Supreme
Court decisions have removed abuses and that a good faith
or reasonable mistake exception only encourages ignorance
of the law by the police as a defense to their misconduct,
requiring courts to make a subjective determination con-
122. See, e.g., Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53
CALIF. L. REv. 929, 951-53 (1965); Posner, Excessive Sanctionsfor Governmental Mis-
conduct in Criminal Cases, 57 WASH. L. REV. 635, 638-42 (1982); Wingo, Growing
Disillusionment with the Exclusionary Rule, 25 Sw. L.J. 573, 584-85 (1971); Wright,
Must the Criminal Go Free ff the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEX. L. REV. 736, 737
(1972). See also Canon, supra note 118, at 560; Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amend-
ment: The Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternative, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 621, 656-83;
Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid EvidenceZ 62 JUDICATURE 214
(1978); Note, The Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure: Examination and Progno-
sis, 20 U. KAN. L. REV. 768, 782-88 (1972).
123. See Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3419-20. For a discussion of the good faith excep-
tion, see generally United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980)(en banc);
Ashdown, Good Faith, the Exclusionary Remedy, and Rule-OrientedAdjudication in the
Criminal Process, 124 WM. & MARY L. REv. 335 (1983); Bernardi, The Exclusionary
Rule: Is a Good Faith Standard Needed to Preserve a Liberal Interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment?, 30 DE PAUL L. REv. 51 (1980); Brown, The Good Faith Excep-
tion to the Exclusionary Rule, 23 S. TEX. L.J. 655 (1982); Friendly, supra note 122, at
951-56 (1965); Geller, Is the Evidence In on the Exclusionary Rule", 67 A.B.A. J. 1642
(1981); Oaks, supra note 35, at 709; Schroeder, Deterring Fourth Amendment Viola-
tions: Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1412-21 (1981); Com-
ment, Reason and the Fourth Amendment - The Burger Court and the Exclusionary
Rule, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 139, 168-75 (1977); Comment, The Exclusionary Rule Re-
visited- Good Faith in Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure, 70 Ky. L.J. 879 (1982);
Comment, On the Limitations of Empirical Evaluations of the Exclusionary Rule: A
Critique of the Spiotta Research and United States v. Calandra, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 740
(1974). See also ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIMES FINAL
REPORT (1981).
For a discussion of the "reasonableness" element in a reasonable mistake or good
faith exception, see generally Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amendment: The "Rea-
sonable" Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 635
(1978); Bernardi, supra note 123, at 101-04; Note, The Proposed Good Faith Test for
Fourth Amendment Exclusion Compared to the § 1983 Good Faith Defense: Problems
and Prospects, 20 ARiz. L. REv. 915, 930-33 (1978).
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cerning the executing officer's state of mind. 24 On this issue,
Professor LaFave has commented that if an exception to the
rule were adopted, the courts would lose control of the
fourth amendment the same way they lost control of the fifth
amendment before the Miranda decision under the volun-
tariness test governing admission of confessions. 25
B. Alternatives to the Rule
If, as retired Justice Potter Stewart has suggested, 126 the
problem is with the fourth amendment and not the exclu-
sionary rule, the amendment could be amended to read:
(1) The right of the people to be secure in their houses,
papers, and effects must be balanced with society's in-
terests in law enforcement and conviction of those
guilty of crimes. Judicial and law enforcement officers
should act to ensure that evidence-gathering proce-
dures are reasonable. Normally, this standard requires
the use of a warrant, issued by an independent judicial
officer, based upon probable cause, and supported by
an attached oath or affirmation describing the place to
be searched and the person(s) or thing(s) to be seized.
(2) Notwithstanding section one, any evidence that is rele-
vant and reliable is admissible at trial regardless of its
source.
(3) Whenever evidence gathering or other actions result in
a deprivation of the right to be secure from unreasona-
ble searches, such injury shall be redressed as Congress
provides; or if Congress does not provide, in any state
124. For a criticism of the good faith exception, see generally Fyfe, Enforcement
Workshop: In Search of the "Bad Faith" Search, 18 CRIM. L. BULL. 260 (1982);
Goodpaster, An Essay on Ending the Exclusionary Rule, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 1065
(1982); LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Impe fect World On Drawing "Bright
Lines" and "Good Faith", 43 U. PiTT. L. REv. 307 (1982); Mertens & Wasserstrom,
The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and De-
railing the Law, 70 GEo. L.J. 365 (1981); Uvifler, TheAcquisition of Evidencefor Crim-
inal Prosecutions: Some Constitutional Premises and Practices in Transition 35 vAND.
L. REv. 501 (1982); Note, The Emerging Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary
Rule, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 112 (1981).
125. See Fitzhugh, The New Exclusionary Rule Cases, 70 A.B.A. J. 58, 61 (1984)
(quoting Professor LaFave).
126. See Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond" The Origins, Develop-
ment, and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 CoLuM. L.
Rnv. 1365, 1392 (1982).
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or federal court by a tort action based on this
amendment.
Lesser included remedies could be statutorily created or
judicially developed. Congress could authorize suits under
specific statutes or rules, for example, by enlarging 18 U.S.C.
§ 242 or 42 U.S.C. § 1983.127 Fourth amendment rights are
as worthy of protection as the right to correct credit informa-
tion which is protected by the Truth in Lending Act. 128 Al-
ternatively, Congress could set up an independent
administrative procedure like that applicable to veterans'
claims 129 or sanction administrative procedures like those the
Supreme Court recommended for processing prisoner prop-
erty claims in Parratt v. Taylor.130 Either alternative would
isolate the fourth amendment deprivation proceeding from
any state or federal criminal trial. Administrative proceed-
ings would preclude judges from deciding claims against
judges and plaintiff criminal defendants from having to win
jury suits against the police. Review could be to the United
States Courts of Appeals. A "clearly erroneous" or "against
the clear weight of the evidence" standard of review could
be employed or review could be limited to seeing that due
process was not denied.
An alternative legislative response would be to set out
police guidelines by statute or regulation. For example, po-
lice regulations could spell out all exceptions to the warrant
requirement or to the requirement that the warrant list the
items to be seized. Courts could ensure that the guidelines
were consistent with fourth amendment dictates. When act-
ing within the guidelines, police conduct would be presumed
to be reasonable. This system would ensure uniformity of
treatment, limit the broad discretion police officers exercise,
and provide a standard for evaluation. Actions outside the
127. 42 U.S.C § 1983 (1982) provides that a civil action may be brought against
any person who, under color of law, deprives any United States citizen, or person
within the jurisdiction thereof, of any rights granted by the Constitution. 18 U.S.C.
§ 242 (1982) provides that a criminal action may be brought against any person who,
under color of law, deprives an alien or citizen of any constitutionally protected right
because of the citizen's color or race.
128. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1982).
129. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 301-62 (1982).
130. 451 U.S. 527 (1981). See also Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman, 14
AM. U.L. REv. 1 (1964) (advocating a review board).
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guidelines not justified as reasonable could be punished by
named penalties, exclusion of evidence, or both.13 '
Courts could encourage the use of judicially recognized
tort or Bivens actions. 32 But even if the Supreme Court au-
thorized such suits 33 judgments would be difficult to obtain
against police and judicial officers because of their good
faith and absolute immunity, respectively. 34  Victims of
fourth amendment violations, particularly innocent victims,
are reluctant to prosecute, and awards are likely to be nomi-
nal. Ifjuries refused to make awards against officials, a right
to non-jury trials could be recognized.
Another possible solution is that the exclusionary rule
could be limited to lesser crimes. For example, it could be
abolished in homicide prosecutions. 35 However, such dif-
ferentiation might create havoc in plea bargaining. A de-
fendant charged with first degree murder would have a very
strong motive to plead guilty to a lesser offense if incriminat-
ing, illegally seized evidence could be introduced in a mur-
der trial. And prosecutors might stretch to charge offenses
exempted from the rule solely to be able to introduce ille-
gally seized items. Such a law also might create serious
equal protection problems for those not afforded its
protection.
131. For an analysis of jurisdictions employing administrative remedies, see
Bradley, The Exclusionary Rule in Germany, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1983); Com-
ment, Comparative Anaysis of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 57 TUL. L.
REV. 648, 659-81 (1983). See also Kaczynski, The Admissibili y of Illegally Obtained
Evidence: American and Foreign Approaches Compared, 101 MIL. L. REv. 83 (1983).
132. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotic Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). For
further discussion of such tort remedies, see 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 2, at 30-33;
Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REv.
1532, 1562-63 (1972); Morris, The Exclusionary Rule, Deterrence and Posner's Eco-
nomic Analysis of Law, 57 WASH. L. REv. 647 (1982). ButseeBlumrosen, Contempt of
Court and Unlawful Police Action, 11 RUTGERS L. REV. 526 (1957); Foote, Tort Reme-
dies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REv. 493 (1955).
133. The Supreme Court has exhibited a kind of approach-avoidance behavior
toward such actions. See, e.g., Haing v. Prosise, 103 S. Ct. 2368 (1983); Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
134. And the Court may act to restrict such suits in certain circumstances. See
Chappell v. Wallace, 103 S. Ct. 2362 (1983) (military personnel may not maintain suit
against their superior officer for alleged constitutional violations).
135. See Allen, supra note 35, at 36; Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule,
26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1044-49 (1974).
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Problems with these alternatives were outlined by Chief
Justice Burger in Stone v. Powell:136
It can no longer be assumed that other branches of govern-
ment will act while judges cling to the Draconian, discred-
ited device in its present absolutist form. Legislatures are
unlikely to create statutory alternatives, or impose direct
sanctions on errant police officers or on the public treasury
by way of tort action, so long as persons who commit seri-
ous crimes continue to reap the enormous and undeserved
benefits of the exclusionary rule. 137
Chief Justice Burger explained that even if legislatures were
to act no assurance would exist that courts would abolish
the rule. 38 He opined that the greatest shortcoming of leav-
ing the defense of the fourth amendment to the exclusionary
rule is that it offers no relief to those victims of overzealous
police work who never appear in court. 139
V. CONCLUSION
With the Leon majority's recognition that evidence
seized pursuant to a warrant not based on probable cause
need not be suppressed as long as the police act in good
faith, with the Sheppard majority's holding that the good
faith execution of a technically invalid warrant does not re-
quire suppression of evidence obtained with it, and with the
Nix majority's recognition of an "independent source" ex-
ception to the exclusionary rule, the balance has apparently
shifted away from individual rights to the interest in convict-
ing the guilty. But the lesson of history is that the pendulum
will swing back. No single philosophy has stayed in power,
as sooner or later successful challengers emerge and "un-
pack" the Court. Faith in the system and in the Court to
withstand particular philosophies is justified because the ju-
diciary has proven to be remarkably independent. This opti-
mism is not reposed in a particular jurist, judicial
136. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
137. Id. at 500-01 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
138. Id. at 501.
139. Id For additional discussions of alternatives, see S. SCHLESINGER, EXCLU-
SIONARY INJUSTICE (1977); Geller, supra note 123, at 689-721; Miles, Decline ofthe
Fourth Amendment: Time to Overrule Mapp v. Ohio?, 27 CATH. U.L. REV. 9 (1977).
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philosophy, or even Term of Court, but in the process and
form of government.
Critics may lament the Supreme Court's two-step-for-
ward, one-step-backward approach. But it is a strength of
our judicial system and form of government that the Court
continues to wrestle with the issues raised in the Nix Leon,
and Sheppard decisions. In these cases the public outcry to
punish the defendant may not be reconcilable with the de-
fendant's fourth amendment rights. The Court's distinction
between judicial errors and police misconduct and its recog-
nition of a good faith or reasonable mistake exception to the
exclusionary rule dealt the rule a crushing blow; but it may
yet survive.
If the exclusionary rule is a weakness in our criminal law,
it is a strength of our individual freedom, and the strain it
places on society and our legal system may be better toler-
ated than shifted. Justice Holmes cautioned that where dis-
tinctions are vital rather than formal, problems and conflicts
should be existentially endured rather than rationally recon-
ciled. 140 Hopefully, the Court will not abrogate the exclu-
sionary rule, even if that leaves the dilemma unresolved.
140. Dunne, Book Review, 80 MICH. L. REv. 652, 655 (1982).
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